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Abstract
In this paper, we study a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social networks.
We consider two firms in a market competing to maximize the consumption of their products. Firms have
a limited budget which can be either invested on the quality of the product or spent on initial seeding in
the network in order to better facilitate spread of the product. After the decision of firms, agents choose
their consumptions following a myopic best response dynamics which results in a local, linear update
for their consumption decision. We characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between firms
and study the effect of the budgets as well as the network structure on the optimal allocation. We show
that at the equilibrium, firms invest more budget on quality when their budgets are close to each other.
However, as the gap between budgets widens, competition in qualities becomes less effective and firms
spend more of their budget on seeding. We also show that given equal budget of firms, if seeding budget
is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will also be nonzero for any other graph, and if seeding budget is zero
for a star graph it will be zero for any other graph as well. As a practical extension, we then consider
a case where products have some preset qualities that can be only improved marginally. At some point
in time, firms learn about the network structure and decide to utilize a limited budget to mount their
market share by either improving the quality or new seeding some agents to incline consumers towards
their products. We show that the optimal budget allocation in this case simplifies to a threshold strategy.
Interestingly, we derive similar results to that of the original problem, in which preset qualities simulate
the role that budgets had in the original setup.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many recent studies have documented the role of social networks in individual purchasing
decisions [2]–[4]. More data from online social networks and advances in information technolo-
gies have drawn the attention of firms to exploit this information for their marketing goals. As
a result, firms have become more interested in models of influence spread in social networks in
order to improve their marketing strategies. In particular, considering the relationship between
people in social networks and their rational choices, many retailers are interested to know how
to use the information about the dynamics of the spread in order to maximize their product
consumption and achieve the most profit in a competitive market.
A main feature of product consumption in these settings is what is often called the “network
effect” or positive externality. For such products, consumption of each agent incentivizes the
neighboring agents to consume more as well, as the consumption decisions between agents and
their neighbors are strategic complements of each other. There are diverse sets of examples for
such products or services. New technologies and innovations, mobile applications (e.g., Viber,
WhatsApp), online games (e.g., Warcraft), social network web sites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and
online dating services (e.g., Zoosk, Match.com, OkCupid) are among many examples in which
consuming from a common product or service is more preferable for people.
Also, a main property of many products is substitution. A substitute product is a product or
service that satisfies the need of a consumer that another product or service fulfills (e.g. Viber
and WhatsApp or Gmail and Yahoo email accounts). In all these examples, firms might be
interested to utilize the social network among consumers and the positive externality of their
products and services to incentivize a larger consumption of their products compared to rival
substitute products. Therefore, it is important for firms to know how to shape their strategies in
designing their products and offering them to a set of people in order to promote their products
intelligently, and eventually achieving a larger share in the market.
In this paper, we study strategic competition between two firms trying to maximize their
product consumption. Firms simultaneously allocate their fixed budgets between seeding a set
of costumers embedded in a social network and designing the quality of their products. The
consumption of each agent is the result of its myopic best response to the previous actions of
its peers in the network. Therefore, a firm should provide enough incentives for spread of its
product through the payoff that agents receive by consuming it. For this purpose and considering
their budgets, firms should strategically design their products and know how to initially seed the
network.
We model the above problem as a fixed-sum game between firms, where each firm tries to
maximize discounted sum of its product consumption over time, considering its fixed budget.
We describe the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between firms which depends on the
budgets of the firms and the network structure. We show that at the Nash equilibrium, firms
spend more budget on quality when their budgets are close. However, as the difference between
budgets increases, firms spend more budget on seeding. We also show that given equal budget
of firms, if seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph it will also be nonzero for any other
graph, and if seeding budget is zero for a star graph it will be zero for any other graph too.
Next, we study a different scenario in which firms produce products with some preset qualities.
At some point in time, firms learn about the network structure and dedicate some budget to
increase their product consumption. The budget can be spent on new seeding of agents in the
social network and marginally improving the quality of the products. We derive a simple rule
for optimal allocation of the budget between improving the quality and new seeding which in
particular depends on the network structure and preset qualities of the products. We show that
the optimal allocation of the budget depends on the entire centrality distribution of the graph.
Specially, we show that maximum seeding occurs in a graph with maximum number of agents
with centralities above a certain threshold. Also, the difference in qualities of firms plays an
important role in the optimal allocation of the budget. In particular, we show that as the gap
between the qualities of the products widens, the firms allocate more budget to seeding. We see
that the budgets in the first scenario and preset qualities of the second scenario play similar roles
in the optimal allocation.
It is worthwhile to note that the problem of influence and spread in networks has been
extensively studied in the past few years [5]–[11]. Also, diffusion of new behaviors and strategies
through local coordination games has been an active field of research [12]–[19]. Goyal and
Kearns proposed a game theoretic model of product adoption in [20]. They computed upper
bounds of the price of anarchy and showed how network structure may amplify the initial
budget differences. Similarly, in [21] Bimpikis, Ozdaglar and Yildiz proposed a game theoretic
model of competition between firms which can target their marketing budgets to individuals
embedded in a social network. They provided conditions under which it is optimal for the firms
to asymmetrically target a subset of the individuals. Also, Chasparis and Shamma assumed a
dynamical model of preferences in [10] and computed optimal policies for finite and infinite
horizon where endogenous network influences, competition between two firms and uncertainties
in the network model were studied. The main contribution of our work is to explicitly study the
tradeoff between investing on quality of a product and initial seeding in a social network. Our
model is similar to the model proposed in [22], however, instead of pricing strategy in [22], the
notion of quality is introduced and the tradeoff between quality and seeding is studied. Also,
our model is tractable and allows us to characterize the exact product consumption at each time,
instead of lower and upper bounds provided in [23], [24].
II. THE SPREAD DYNAMICS
There are n agents V = {1, . . . , n} in a social network. The relationship among agents is
represented by a directed graph G = (V,E) in which agents i, j ∈ V are neighbors if (i, j) ∈ E.
The weighted adjacency matrix of the graph G is denoted by a row stochastic matrix G where
the ij-th entry of G, denoted by gij , represents the strength of the influence of agent j on i.
For diagonal elements of matrix G, we have gii = 0 for all agents i ∈ V . We assume that
there are two competing firms a and b producing product a and b. Each agent has one unit
demand which can be supplied by either of the firms. We define the variable 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ 1− xi(t) ≤ 1 as the consumption of the product a and b by agent i at time t.
Denote by qa, qb ≥  > 0 the quality of product a and b respectively, where  has an
infinitesimal value. The values of qa and qb can be interpreted as the payoff that any two agents
i and j would achieve if they both consume the same product. In other words, we can assume
qa and qb are payoffs of the following game
xj 1− xj
xi qaxixj 0
1− xi 0 qb(1− xi)(1− xj)
Since agents benefit from the same action of their neighbors, this game could be thought of as
a local coordination game. From the above table it follows easily that the payoff of agents i and
j from their interaction is
uij(xi, xj) = qaxixj + qb(1− xi)(1− xj).
We also assume that each agent benefits from taking action xi irrespective of actions taken by
its neighbors. We assume the isolation payoff of consuming xi and 1− xi from product a and
b is represented by the following quadratic form functions
uaii = qa(αxi − βx2i ), ubii = qb[α(1− xi)− β(1− xi)2],
where α and β are parameters of the isolation payoff. This forms of payoff indicates that a
product with higher quality has a higher isolation payoff. The total isolation payoff of agent i
can be written as
uii(xi) = {qa(αxi − βx2i )}+ {qb
(
α(1− xi)− β(1− xi)2
)}.
In order to have nonnegative isolation payoff for xi = 0 and xi = 1, we assume β ≤ α. Assuming
quadratic form function for the isolation payoff not only makes the analysis more tractable, but
also is a good second order approximation for the general class of concave payoff functions. By
changing the variables xi = 12 + yi after simplification we get
uij(yi, yj) = qa(
1
2
+ yi)(
1
2
+ yj) + qb(
1
2
− yi)(1
2
− yj),
uii(yi) = (qa + qb)(
α
2
− β
4
− βy2i ) + (qa − qb)(α− β)yi.
Therefore, the total utility of agent i from taking action yi is given by
Ui(yi, ~y−i) = (qa + qb)(
α
2
− β
4
− βy2i ) + (qa − qb)(α− β)yi
+ qa
n∑
j=1
gij(
1
2
+ yi)(
1
2
+ yj) + qb
n∑
j=1
gij(
1
2
− yi)(1
2
− yj).
(1)
In the above equation ~y−i denotes an action vector of all agents other than agent i. From equation
(1) we can see that product a and b have a positive externality effect in the network, meaning that
the usage level of an agent has a positive impact on the usage level of its neighbors. Therefore,
it follows that qa and qb in addition to the payoff of a local coordination game, can be interpreted
as coefficients of network externality of product a and b respectively.
We assume agents repeatedly apply myopic best response to the actions of their neighbors.
This means that each agent, considering its neighbors consumptions at the current period, chooses
the amount of the product that maximizes its current payoff, as its consumption for the next
period. In other words, consumption of agent i at time t+ 1 is updated as follows
yi(t+ 1) = arg max
yi
Ui(yi(t), ~y−i(t)).
The above equation results in the following update dynamics
yi(t+ 1) = (
1
2β
)
n∑
j=1
gijyj(t) + (
qa − qb
4β(qa + qb)
)
n∑
j=1
gij + (
(α− β)(qa − qb)
2β(qa + qb)
).
Therefore, the consumption of the product a can be written as the following linear update
dynamics form
~y(t+ 1) = (
1
2β
)G~y(t) + (
(1 + 2(α− β))(qa − qb)
4β(qa + qb)
)~1. (2)
Similarly, for the consumption of the product b we have 1− xi(t) = 12 − yi(t).
Assumption 1: We assume 1 +α ≤ 2β. This assumption guaranties that 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1 for all
i and all t under the update rule (2).
Using the above assumption and defining
W , ( 1
2β
)G, ~ua ,
(
(
1 + 2(α− β)
4β
)(
qa − qb
qa + qb
)
)
~1, (3)
equations (2) can be written as
~y(t+ 1) = W~y(t) + ~ua.
The above equation can be expanded as
~y(t) = W t~y(0) +
t−1∑
k=0
W k~ua. (4)
Therefore, the consumption of agents depends on the initial preferences, i.e. ~y(0), the quality of
product a and b, i.e. qa and qb, and the structure of the network, i.e. the matrix G. In the next
section we discuss how firms can exploit this information in order to maximize their product
consumption and also characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of the game played between two
firms.
III. OPTIMAL BUDGET ALLOCATION
In this section we describe the game between firms where each firm aims to maximize the
consumption of its product over an infinite time horizon given a fixed budget. Each firm has
an initial budget that it can either invest on “quality” or spend it on promoting its product by
seeding some of the agents, or both. This initial seeding can be viewed as free offers to promote
the products in the network. We define the utility of each firm as the discounted sum of its
product consumption over time
Ua =
∞∑
t=0
δt~1T ((0.5)~1 + ~y(t)),
Ub =
∞∑
t=0
δt~1T ((0.5)~1− ~y(t)).
Each firm has a limited budget Ka, Kb that can spend on either initial seeding, i.e. ~Sa and ~Sb,
or designing the quality of its product, i.e. qa and qb, or both. Seeding ~Sa and ~Sb will change
the initial consumption of products a and b by ~Sa − ~Sb and ~Sb − ~Sa respectively. Therefore, the
amount that agents initially consume from product a and b will be ~x(0) = (0.5)~1 + ~Sa − ~Sb
and ~1− ~x(0) = (0.5)~1 + ~Sb − ~Sa. This means that if both firms seed an agent equally then the
agent has no preference for one product over the other, i.e. ~y(0) = ~0. This assumption can be
justified since agents should be initially indifferent between products before their consumption
and realizing the quality of products if initial seedings by firms are equal. In order to have
0 ≤ xi(0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 1− xi(0) ≤ 1 for all agents i, we impose the constraints ‖~Sa‖∞ ≤ 0.5
and ‖~Sb‖∞ ≤ 0.5. This means that firms can initially seed agents up to their demand capacity
which is 0.5 for all agents. Using equations (3) and (4) and defining the centrality vector v
by v = (I − δW T )−1~1 where agents are ordered from the highest to the lowest centrality, i.e.
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn, and noting that
∑
vi =
2βn
2β−δ , the utilities of firms can be written as
Ua = (
n
2(1− δ)) + v
T ~Sa − vT ~Sb + λ(qa − qb
qa + qb
),
Ub = (
n
2(1− δ)) + v
T ~Sb − vT ~Sa + λ(qb − qa
qa + qb
),
(5)
where
λ =
δ(1 + 2(α− β))n
2(1− δ)(2β − δ) . (6)
We assume the cost of each unit of quality is given by cq and the cost of each unit of initial
seeding is given by cs. Therefore, the game between the firms can be written as
max
~Sa,qa
(
n
2(1− δ)) + v
T ~Sa − vT ~Sb + λ(qa − qb
qa + qb
),
s.t. cs‖~Sa‖1 + cqqa = Ka,
for firm a, and
max
~Sb,qb
(
n
2(1− δ)) + v
T ~Sb − vT ~Sa + λ(qb − qa
qa + qb
),
s.t. cs‖~Sb‖1 + cqqb = Kb,
for firm b. Since the effect of the action of ~Sb is decoupled from ~Sa in Ua, therefore, the
optimization problem of firm a is equivalent to
max
~Sa,qa
vT ~Sa + λ(
qa − qb
qa + qb
),
s.t. cs‖~Sa‖1 + cqqa = Ka.
Similarly, for firm b we have
max
~Sb,qb
vT ~Sb + λ(
qb − qa
qa + qb
),
s.t. cs‖~Sb‖1 + cqqb = Kb.
Remark 1: It can be easily shown that for a seeding budget ‖Sa‖1, the optimal seeding strategy
is to seed the agents in the order of their centralities (from highest to lowest) until we either
ran out of budget or all the agents are seeded. Therefore, an optimal action (~Sa, qa) is fully
determined from (‖Sa‖1, qa), thus reducing the action space of firm a to only qa, given its
budget constraint. Similar argument holds for firm b. Therefore, we may look at the utilities Ua
and Ub as functions of (qa, qb) under the optimal seeding and fixed budgets.
In order to study the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the above game,
we use a variation of the well-known Sion’s minimax theorem (see [25] for the original Sion’s
theorem) as below.
Lemma 1: Consider a two person zero-sum game, on closed, bounded, and convex finite-
dimensional action sets Ω1×Ω2, defined by the continuous function L(x1, x2). Let L(x1, x2) be
strictly convex in x1 for each x2 ∈ Ω2 and strictly concave in x2 for each x1 ∈ Ω1. Then the
game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: See Theorem A.4 on page 286 in [26].
In the following theorem we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game played between
firms.
Theorem 1: Consider firms a and b with utility functions Ua and Ub as described in (5). The
game between firms admits a unique Nash equilibrium of form
q∗a = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
v˜l
(v˜k + v˜l)2
), q∗b = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
v˜k
(v˜k + v˜l)2
),
S∗ai =

1
2
1 ≤ i < k,
Ka
cs
− k−1
2
− 2λv˜l
(v˜k+v˜l)2
i = k,
0 i > k,
S∗bi =

1
2
1 ≤ i < l,
Kb
cs
− l−1
2
− 2λv˜k
(v˜k+v˜l)2
i = l,
0 i > l,
(7)
for some vk ≤ v˜k ≤ vk−1 and vl ≤ v˜l ≤ vl−1 that satisfy
0 ≤ S∗ak =
Ka
cs
− k − 1
2
− 2λv˜l
(v˜k + v˜l)2
<
1
2
,
0 ≤ S∗bl =
Kb
cs
− l − 1
2
− 2λv˜k
(v˜k + v˜l)2
<
1
2
,
(8)
where v˜k = vk if S∗ak > 0 and v˜l = vl if S
∗
al
> 0. 1
Proof: Given the optimal seeding of each firm, i.e. seeding agents from the highest to the
lowest centrality, as discussed in Remark 1, the tradeoff between seeding amount and quality
can be solved by optimizing Ua and Ub with respect to qa and qb respectively. The action space
of firms, i.e.  ≤ qa ≤ Kacq and  ≤ qb ≤ Kbcq , is a closed, bounded, and convex finite-dimensional
set. Also, Ua + Ub = n(1−δ) , hence, the game is a fixed-sum game and can be transformed to
a zero sum game by subtracting the constant value of n
2(1−δ) from Ua and Ub. The term v
T ~Sa
in Ua is piecewise linear in ‖Sa‖1 and thus in qa, under optimal seeding. Using this, it is easy
to see that Ua(qa, qb) is strictly concave in qa for each qb, and strictly convex in qb for each
qa via a similar argument. Therefore, based on Lemma 1, the game admits a unique Nash
equilibrium. Assume that the first (k − 1) and (l − 1) agents are fully seeded by firms a and b
respectively at equilibrium. Then, from the budget constraints we have S∗ak =
Ka
cs
− k−1
2
− ( cq
cs
)qa,
and S∗bl =
Kb
cs
− l−1
2
− ( cq
cs
)qb, therefore, by plugging in the vector of optimal seeding S∗a and S
∗
b
1We define v0 ,∞. If S∗an = 12 or S∗bn = 12 , then v˜n ≤ vn.
as described earlier, the optimization problem of firms is given by
max
≤qa≤Kacq
(
1
2
)
k−1∑
i=1
vi + (
Ka
cs
− k − 1
2
− (cq
cs
)qa)vk + λ(
qa − qb
qa + qb
),
max
≤qb≤Kbcq
(
1
2
)
l−1∑
i=1
vi + (
Kb
cs
− l − 1
2
− (cq
cs
)qb)vl + λ(
qb − qa
qa + qb
).
If 0 < S∗ak <
1
2
and 0 < S∗bl <
1
2
, the first order optimality condition requires taking the derivative
of the two equations above with respect to qa and qb and setting them to zero
− (cq
cs
)vk + (
2λqb
(qa + qb)2
) = 0,
− (cq
cs
)vl + (
2λqa
(qa + qb)2
) = 0.
Solving equations above we get
q∗a = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
vl
(vk + vl)2
),
q∗b = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
vk
(vk + vl)2
),
where 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n are integers that must satisfy conditions in (8) for v˜k = vk and v˜l = vl. If
S∗ak = 0 and S
∗
bl
= 0, the first order optimality condition is as follows
vk ≤ v˜k ≤ vk−1, vl ≤ v˜l ≤ vl−1, (9)
where
v˜k = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qb
(qa + qb)2
), v˜l = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qa
(qa + qb)2
), (10)
and if S∗an =
1
2
or S∗bn =
1
2
then v˜n ≤ vn. We can solve q∗a and q∗b in terms of v˜k and v˜l as
described in (7).
Corollary 1: If firms have equal budgets Ka = Kb = K, then in the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium of the game between firms we have
q∗a = q
∗
b = (
λ
2
)(
cs
cq
)(
1
v˜l
), S∗ai = S
∗
bi
=

1
2
1 ≤ i < l,
K
cs
− l−1
2
− λ
2v˜l
i = l,
0 i > l,
(11)
for some vl ≤ v˜l ≤ vl−1 that satisfy
0 ≤ S∗al = S∗bl =
K
cs
− l − 1
2
− λ
2v˜l
<
1
2
, (12)
where v˜l = vl if S∗al = S
∗
bl
> 0. 2
Equation (7) indicates that the Nash equilibrium depends on both the budgets of the firms, i.e.
Ka and Kb, centrality distribution of agents in the network, i.e. v. We will discuss the effect of
each of these factors on the Nash equilibrium in the following subsections. All of our analysis
here is for firm a and similar results can be shown for firm b as well. For simplicity, we only
discuss seeding budget; quality budget can be found easily using the budget constraint.
A. Effect of Budget of Firms on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study how the budget of each firm, i.e. Ka and Kb, can influence the
Nash equilibrium. As it can be seen from (7), the Nash equilibrium depends on both v˜k and
v˜l, which in turn depend on firm’s and its rival’s budgets, i.e. both Ka and Kb. In the first
proposition, we compare the seeding budget and quality of two firms at the Nash equilibrium
with respect to their budgets. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2: At the Nash equilibrium, if q∗a < q
∗
b , then ‖~S∗a‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗b ‖1.
Proof: If q∗a < q
∗
b , then from (7), we have v˜l < v˜k. If v˜l < v˜k then either k < l or l = k.
If k < l it is obvious to see that ~S∗a ≤ ~S∗b . If l = k then we have two cases: If 0 < S∗ak < 12 ,
then based on (9) we have v˜k = vk = vl ≤ v˜l which is a contradiction with v˜l < v˜k. If S∗ak = 0,
then obviously S∗ak ≤ S∗bl and therefore, ~S∗a ≤ ~S∗b . If S∗an = 12 , then v˜l < v˜k = v˜n ≤ vn, hence,
S∗bn =
1
2
. This finishes the proof.
2We define v0 ,∞. If S∗an = S∗bn = 12 , then v˜n ≤ vn.
The next proposition states that the firm with higher budget surpasses the rival in both quality
and seeding.
Proposition 1: The firm with higher budget has higher seeding budget and quality, i.e. if
Kb ≤ Ka, then ‖~S∗b ‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗a‖1 and q∗b ≤ q∗a.
Proof: Suppose that q∗a < q
∗
b . From Lemma 2 we have ‖~S∗a‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗b ‖1, which contradicts
with Kb ≤ Ka. Also, suppose ‖~S∗a‖1 < ‖~S∗b ‖1, then from Lemma 2 we have q∗a ≤ q∗b , which
contradicts with Kb ≤ Ka. This completes the proof.
In the next proposition we explain how the seeding budget and quality at the Nash equilibrium
vary with Ka and Kb.
Proposition 2: Given a fixed graph, the optimal seeding ‖S∗a‖1 and quality q∗a at the Nash
equilibrium are increasing functions of Ka. Furthermore, ‖S∗a‖1 is a decreasing function of Kb
if Kb ≤ Ka and an increasing function of Kb if Ka ≤ Kb.
Proof: First note that ‖S∗a‖1, ‖S∗b ‖1, q∗a, q∗b (and as a result v˜k and v˜l) are continuous
functions of Ka and Kb. To see this, let B(qa, qb, Ka, Kb) denote the best response of the firms
to qualities (qa, qb) when the budgets are (Ka, Kb). It follows from the continuity of the best
response and compactness of action spaces that the set {(q∗a, q∗b )|B(q∗a, q∗b , Ka, Kb) = (q∗a, q∗b )},
that is the equilibrium space, is closed. This implies that the graphs of the functions q∗a(Ka, Kb)
and q∗b (Ka, Kb) are closed and thus are continuous.
Now, if 0 < S∗ak <
1
2
, then v˜k = vk. If Ka marginally increases, then, using the continuity
of the equilibrium, the level k and as a result v˜k does not change. Thus, given fixed Kb, the
constraint for firm b in (8) and hence v˜l does not change. Therefore, if Ka marginally increases,
from the Nash equilibrium in (7), q∗a does not change and S
∗
ak
marginally increases. If S∗ak = 0
and vk < v˜k < vk−1, and Ka marginally increases, from the continuity of Nash we still have
vk < v˜
′
k < vk−1 and as a result S
∗
ak
= 0 does not change and hence, q∗a marginally increases. If
S∗ak = 0 and v˜k = vk or v˜k = vk−1, and Ka marginally increases, either we have vk < v˜
′
k < vk−1
which means S∗ak = 0 does not change and q
∗
a marginally increases, or v˜k does not change. In this
latter case, given the fixed budget Kb, the constraint for firm b in (8) will remain unchanged and
hence v˜l will not change. Therefore, from the Nash equilibrium in (7), q∗a does not change and
as a result S∗ak marginally increases. It is to be noted here that the cases where v˜k moves above
vk−1 or below vk are not feasible as they will cause a jump in the seeding budget, contradicting
the continuity of equilibrium. The analysis for the case when S∗an =
1
2
and v˜n ≤ vn is quite
similar. Therefore, ∂‖
~S∗a‖1
∂Ka
≥ 0 and ∂q∗a
∂Ka
≥ 0.
For the second part of the proposition, if S∗ak = 0 and vk < v˜k < vk−1 and Kb marginally
increases, from continuity of v˜k we still have vk < v˜′k < vk−1, and therefore, S
∗
ak
= 0 and given
the fixed Ka, q∗a does not change. Hence, we only need to consider the case where 0 < S
∗
ak
< 1
2
and v˜k = vk, or S∗ak = 0 and v˜k = vk or v˜k = vk−1. In these cases, it is easy to see that
either v˜k or S∗ak remains unchanged. In the latter case, (given the fixed Ka) q
∗
a does not change.
Similar argument holds for when S∗an =
1
2
and v˜n ≤ vn. Therefore, we only need to consider
the case where v˜k does not change. From the first part of the proposition, q∗b is an increasing
function of Kb. Also, from Proposition 1, if Kb ≤ Ka (Ka ≤ Kb), then q∗b ≤ q∗a (q∗a ≤ q∗b ).
Therefore, if Kb ≤ Ka (Ka ≤ Kb) and Kb marginally increases, equations (10) implies that q∗a
must marginally increase (decrease) or does not change so that v˜k remains fixed. Hence, given
constant Ka, S∗ak marginally decreases (increases) or does not change. Therefore,
∂‖~S∗a‖1
∂Kb
≤ 0,
for Kb ≤ Ka and ∂‖~S∗a‖1∂Kb ≥ 0, for Ka ≤ Kb.
Proposition 2 implies that when Kb ≤ Ka, the higher the budget of the rival firm, the lower
the seeding budget of firm a, i.e., if Kb ≤ K ′b ≤ Ka then, ‖~S∗a(K ′b)‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗a(Kb)‖1. On the
other hand, when competing with a firm which has a higher budget, i.e. Ka ≤ Kb, the higher
the budget of the rival firm, the higher firm a should spend on seeding. In other words, if
Ka ≤ Kb ≤ K ′b then, ‖~S∗a(Kb)‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗a(K ′b)‖1.
Combining these two results, we can see that given a fixed value of Ka, the seeding budget of
firm a is increasing with the difference |Ka−Kb|. The seeding budget attains its minimum when
Kb = Ka, implying that the firm should allocate more budget to quality to distance itself from
the rival firm. However, as the gap between budget widens, competition in qualities becomes
less effective and firms spend more budget on seeding.
B. Effect of Network Structure on Firms’ Decisions
In this subsection we study the effect of network structure on the Nash equilibrium. Since we
already studied the effect of the budget on the Nash equilibrium, for the rest of this subsection
we assume Ka = Kb = K so that we can observe only the effect of the network structure. We
first focus on two well studied graphs, i.e. star and balanced graphs, and highlight how they can
reflect important properties of the seeding budget. Before continuing further, we first formally
define these two graphs and find their network centralities in the next lemma.
Definition 1: A star graph is a directed graph in which there is an edge from any noncentral
agent i ∈ V − {j} to the central agent j with the weight gij = 1 and there are edges from the
central agent j to all noncentral agents i ∈ V − {j} such that ∑i gji = 1.
Definition 2: A balanced graph is a directed graph in which the in-degree of each agent is
equal to its out-degree, i.e.
∑
j gji =
∑
j gij = 1.
Lemma 3: The centrality of the agents in a balanced graph is given by v¯ = 2β
2β−δ . In a star
graph, the centrality of the central agent is
vsh =
1 + δ(n−1)
2β
1− ( δ
2β
)2
,
and the centrality of non central agents is
vsl =
1 + δ
2β(n−1)
1− ( δ
2β
)2
.
Moreover, for any arbitrary graph G, v¯ ≤ v1 ≤ vsh.
Proof: First part simply follows from the fact that v = (I − δW T )−1~1, where W is given
by (3), and that for any agent i in a balanced graph
∑
gji =
∑
gij = 1. For the star graph,
noting that v = ~1 + δW Tv, we can obtain
vsh = 1 +
δ(n− 1)vsl
2β
,
vsl = 1 +
δvsh
2β(n− 1) ,
solving which we can find vsh and v
s
l as given in the lemma.
Also, for any arbitrary graph G, v1 ≥
∑
vi
n
= v¯. To show v1 ≤ vsh, using v = ~1 + δW Tv for
all j 6= 1 we can obtain
vj ≥ 1 + ( δ
2β
)g1jv1.
This yields
n∑
j=1
vj ≥ (n− 1) + (1 + δ
2β
)v1.
Applying simple algebra along with the fact that
∑
vj =
2βn
2β−δ leads to v1 ≤ vsh.
The next proposition provides a condition for seeding profitability of any general graph. Also,
the seeding budget of star and balanced graphs are compared and it is shown that the graph with
higher seeding budget can be any of the two, depending on the budget.
Proposition 3: If seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will be nonzero for any
other graph too. On the other hand, if seeding budget is zero for a star graph, it will also be
zero for any other graph. Moreover, if 1
2
+ λ
2v¯
< K
cs
< n
2
+ λ
2vsl
, a balanced graph has a larger
seeding budget than a star graph, and if λ
2vsh
< K
cs
< 1
2
+ λ
2v¯
, a star graph has a larger seeding
budget than a balanced graph. For n
2
+ λ
2vsl
< K
cs
< n
2
+ λ
2
they have the same seeding budget.
Proof: If seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, then according to (12) we have
λ
2v¯
< K
cs
. As a result, for any other graph we will have λ
2v1
< K
cs
, since according to Lemma 3
v¯ ≤ v1. This means that there exists at least one agent that must be seeded. On the other hand,
if seeding budget is zero for a star graph, then we must have K
cs
≤ λ
2vsh
. Since we know vsh ≥ vi
for any agent i of any arbitrary graph, therefore, K
cs
≤ λ
2vi
and no agent can be seeded in any
other graph.
For the second part of the proposition, denote quality and seeding budget of balanced and star
graphs by qr, ‖~Sr‖1 and qs, ‖~Ss‖1 respectively. If 12 + λ2v¯ < Kcs < n2 + λ2vsl , then seeding budget is
nonzero for balanced graph and hence, qr = ( cscq )
λ
2v¯
. This implies ‖~Sr‖1 = Kcs − λ2v¯ > 12 . For star
graph 1
2
+ λ
2v¯
< K
cs
< n
2
+ λ
2vsl
implies 1
2
+ λ
2vsh
< K
cs
. Therefore, the central agent in star graph
must be seeded, i.e. Sa1 =
1
2
. If Sa2 = 0, then ‖~Ss‖1 = 12 and clearly ‖~Ss‖1 < ‖~Sr‖1. If Sa2 > 0,
then a noncentral agent must be seeded and we must have qs = ( cscq )
λ
2vsl
. This implies qr < qs
and as a result ‖~Ss‖1 < ‖~Sr‖1.
If λ
2vsh
< K
cs
< 1
2
+ λ
2v¯
, then we have two cases. If K
cs
≤ λ
2v¯
then ‖~Sr‖1 = 0. On the other hand
‖~Ss‖1 > 0 since λ2vsh <
K
cs
. Therefore, clearly ‖~Sr‖1 < ‖~Ss‖1. So let’s assume λ2v¯ < Kcs < 12 + λ2v¯ .
This implies seeding budget is nonzero for balanced graph and hence, qr = ( cscq )
λ
2v¯
. As a result,
‖~Sr‖1 = Kcs − λ2v¯ < 12 . Now again consider two cases. If Kcs < 12 + λ2vsh , then qs = (
cs
cq
) λ
2vsh
, and
hence qs < qr. This implies ‖~Sr‖1 < ‖~Ss‖1. Otherwise, if 12 + λ2vsh ≤
K
cs
then ‖~Ss‖1 ≥ 12 . As a
result, again we have ‖~Sr‖1 < 12 ≤ ‖~Ss‖1.
If n
2
+ λ
2vsl
< K
cs
< n
2
+ λ
2
, then all agents in star graph are seeded up to agents maximum
demand capacities which is 0.5 for each agent. Also, since vsl < v¯, we have
n
2
+ λ
2v¯
< K
cs
.
Hence, all agents in balanced graph are also seeded up to agents maximum demand capacities.
Therefore, both graphs have the same seeding budget. This completes the proof.
The next proposition provides us with a lower and an upper bound for minimum and maximum
seeding budget. In order to characterize the graphs with maximum and minimum seedings for
a given budget K, we need to introduce a few notations first.
Definition 3: Define vmaxl = max vl, i.e. the maximum of the l-th centrality vl among all
possible graphs subject to
∑
vi =
2βn
2β−δ . We can see that v
max
1 = v
s
h and
vmaxl =
nδ
l(2β − δ) + 1, (13)
for l ≥ 2. Similarly, define vminl = min vl, i.e. the minimum of the l-th centrality vl among all
possible graphs subject to
∑
vi =
2βn
2β−δ . It is easy to see that v
min
1 = v¯, v
min
2 = v
s
l , and v
min
l = 1
for l ≥ 3.
Proposition 4: Let (l, v˜maxl ) be the unique pair satisfying condition (12) where v
max
l ≤ v˜maxl ≤
vmaxl−1 and if 0 < S
∗
al
in (12), then v˜maxl = v
max
l . The maximum seeding budget occurs in any
graph for which v˜l = v˜maxl . An example for such a graph is an l-star graph if v˜
max
l = v
max
l
and an (l − 1)-star graph if v˜maxl > vmaxl . 3 Similarly, let (l, v˜minl ) be the unique pair satisfying
condition (12) where vminl ≤ v˜minl ≤ vminl−1 and if 0 < S∗al in (12), then v˜minl = vminl . The
3v˜maxn ≤ vmaxn if S∗an = 12 .
minimum seeding budget occurs in any graph for which v˜l = v˜minl . An example for such graphs
is the balanced graph for l = 1, the star graph for l = 2, and any graph with n− 2 agents with
centrality of one for l ≥ 3. 4
Proof: Let G be a graph attaining the maximum seeding (thus the minimum quality) and
denote its corresponding equilibrium with (l′, v˜l′). Note that l′ ≥ l, since in a graph with v˜l =
v˜maxl the first (l − 1) agents are fully seeded. Now, if l′ > l, then from v˜l′ ≤ vmaxl′−1 ≤ vmaxl and
vmaxl ≤ v˜maxl it follows that v˜l′ ≤ v˜maxl . But, then both pairs (l′, v˜l′) and (l, v˜maxl ) cannot satisfy
(12). Therefore, in a graph with maximum seeding we should have l′ = l. Now, if v˜maxl < v˜l′ ,
then vmaxl < v˜l′ ≤ vmaxl−1 , which contradicts the uniqueness of the pair (l, v˜maxl ). To complete the
proof, we also need to show that v˜l = v˜maxl is achievable. It is quite straightforward to show
that for v˜maxl = v
max
l an l-star graph with v1 = . . . = vl = v
max
l , and for v˜
max
l > v
max
l an
(l− 1)-star graph with v1 = . . . = vl−1 = vmaxl−1 admit (l, v˜maxl ) as the equilibrium. The proof for
the minimum seeding budget is similar.
Example 1: As a numerical example for the minimum and maximum seeding budgets, we
consider a network with n = 15 agents with budget K = 2, quality and seeding costs of
cs = cq = 1 and parameters of α = β = 1 and δ = 0.5. For this example from equations (6)
we have λ = 5. As a result, we can see that for l = 3 and vmax3 =
8
3
from (13), condition
0 < S∗a3 =
1
16
< 1
2
in (12) is satisfied. Therefore, a graph with the maximum seeding budget is a
3-star with the seeding budget of 17
16
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Also, we can see that for l = 1 and
v¯ = 4
3
, condition 0 < S∗a1 =
1
8
< 1
2
in (12) is satisfied. Thus, balanced graph has the minimum
seeding budget of 1
8
. Given vsh = 4.8 and v
s
l = 1.08, it can be seen that in star graph v˜2 =
5
3
and
star graph has a seeding budget of 0.5 which is neither a minimum nor a maximum.
As we saw, the structure of the graphs with minimum and maximum seeding budget depends
on the budget. However, for certain values of budget K the seeding budget will be independent
of the structure of the graph, as described in the next proposition.
Proposition 5: If K
cs
< λ
2vsh
no graph can be seeded. On the other hand, if K
cs
> n
2
+ λ
2
all
4v˜minn ≤ vminn if S∗an = 12 .
Fig. 1. A graph with maximum seeding budget
graphs can be seeded up to agents maximum demand capacities.
Proof: The maximum possible centrality happens for the central agent of the star graph
as shown in Lemma 3. As a result, if K
cs
< λ
2vsh
, then we have K
cs
< λ
2vi
for all i in any graph
and from condition (12) no agent can be seeded. Also, since from definition 1 ≤ vi for all i, if
K
cs
> 1
2
+ λ
2
then we have K
cs
> n
2
+ λ
2vi
for all agents in any graph, and any graph can be seeded
up to agents’ maximum demand capacities which is 0.5 for each agent.
IV. SEEDING VERSUS QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
In this section we describe a scenario in which firms have already produced their products
with some preset quality. We assume at some point in time, say t = 0, firms learn about
the network structure and utilize a fixed budget to maximize their marginal utility by either
marginally “improving the quality” of their products or new seeding some agents to change
their consumption towards their products or both. Since the products have been in the market
for a while, we assume agents have already decided on their consumption from products a and
b which are denoted by ~x(0) and ~1− ~x(0) respectively. Each firm has a limited budget, i.e. Ka
and Kb, that can spend on either new seeding, i.e. ~Sa and ~Sb, or enhancing the quality of its
product, i.e. ∆qa and ∆qb, or both. New seeding ~Sa and ~Sb will change the initial consumption
of products a and b by ~Sa − ~Sb and ~Sb − ~Sa respectively. In order to have 0 ≤ xi(0) ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ 1 − xi(0) ≤ 1 for all agents i, we impose the constraints ‖~Sa + ~y(0)‖∞ ≤ 0.5 and
‖~Sb−~y(0)‖∞ ≤ 0.5. This means that firms can initially seed agents up to their demand capacity.
From equation (5) the marginal change in the utility of firm a and b resulted from the new
budget Ka and Kb are given by
∆Ua = v
T ~Sa − vT ~Sb + 2λqb∆qa
(qa + qb)2
− 2λqa∆qb
(qa + qb)2
,
∆Ub = v
T ~Sb − vT ~Sa + 2λqa∆qb
(qa + qb)2
− 2λqb∆qa
(qa + qb)2
.
We assume the cost of improving the quality by ∆q is given by cq∆q and cq is a large number,
and also the cost of each unit of new seeding is given by cs. Each firm maximizes its marginal
utility given its fixed budget. Since the effect of the action of firm b, i.e. ~Sb and ∆qb, is decoupled
from that of the action of firm a in ∆Ua, thus firm a should solve the following optimization
problem
max
~Sa,∆qa
vT ~Sa +
2λqb∆qa
(qa + qb)2
,
s.t. cs‖~Sa‖1 + cq∆qa = Ka.
(14)
Similarly, for the firm b we have
max
~Sb,∆qb
vT ~Sb +
2λqa∆qb
(qa + qb)2
,
s.t. cs‖~Sb‖1 + cq∆qb = Kb.
(15)
From equations (14) and (15) it can be seen that the optimal strategy of each firm is independent
of the action of the other firm. It is to be noted that despite the independence of the actions, the
optimal strategy of each firm depends on the state (i.e., quality) of the rival firm. This results in
a Nash equilibrium to be simply the pair of the optimal actions of the firms. In the next Theorem
we describe a simple rule for the optimal allocation of the budget for each firm and discuss the
resulting Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2: For firm a, it is more profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality
of its product if vj > vac where
vac , (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qb
(qa + qb)2
). (16)
Similarly, for firm b, it is more profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality of
its product if vj > vbc where
vbc , (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qa
(qa + qb)2
). (17)
Moreover, any pair of the optimal strategies of the firms described by the above threshold rules
describes a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: From equation (14) and (15) the relative marginal utility to cost for spending budget
to seed agent j is vj
cs
. Therefore, it is always more profitable to seed an agent with higher
centrality. Also, the relative marginal utility to cost for spending budget on enhancing quality
of product a is 2λqb
cq(qa+qb)2
according to (14). Therefore, for firm a it is more profitable to seed
agent j rather than enhancing the quality of its product iff
vj
cs
>
2λqb
cq(qa + qb)2
.
This completes the proof. Similar story holds for firm b. Moreover, since the best response of
each firm resulting from equations (14) and (15) is independent of the action of the other firm,
any Nash equilibrium of the game between firms is simply a pair of firms best responses.
Corollary 2: If firms have equal qualities qa = qb = q, for both firms a and b, it is more
profitable to seed agent j rather than enhancing the quality of their products if vj > vc where
vc , (
λ
2
)(
cs
cq
)(
1
q
). (18)
Moreover, any pair of the optimal strategies of the firms described by the above threshold rules
describes a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2: If we compare the thresholds
vac , (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qb
(qa + qb)2
), vbc , (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qa
(qa + qb)2
), (19)
with qualities in Section III
q∗a = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
v˜l
(v˜k + v˜l)2
), q∗b = (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
v˜k
(v˜k + v˜l)2
), (20)
we can see a similarity as follows: In equation (19), qa and qb determine vac and v
b
c which in turn
determine the trade off between ~S and ∆q according to Theorem 2. In Section III, Ka and Kb
determine v˜k and v˜l based on the inequalities in (8) and v˜k and v˜l determine q∗a and q
∗
a according
to (20), which in turn determine the trade of between ~S and q based on the budget constraint.
Therefore, as it will be discussed later, we can achieve similar results for the effect of qa and qb
on the optimal budget allocation, as we did for the effect of Ka and Kb on the Nash equilibrium.
Following the above theorem, the optimal allocation of the budget for each firm is to follow
a so called water-filling strategy, that is, to start seeding in the order of agents’ centralities
until the centrality falls below the threshold given by (16) for firm a or (17) for firm b (in
which case the firm spends the rest of the budget on improving the quality), or the firm runs
out of budget. Also, the amount that agents can be seeded is up to their demand capacity, i.e.
~Smaxa = (0.5)~1 − ~y(0) > 0 and ~Smaxb = (0.5)~1 + ~y(0) > 0. Also, note that if the centrality of
any agent is equal to the threshold defined in (16) or (17), then firms are indifferent between
seeding that agent and quality improvement. Equations (16) and (17) indicate that the optimal
allocation depends on quality of products, i.e. qa and qb and centrality distribution of agents in
the network, i.e. v. In what follows, we will study the effect of each of these factors on the
optimal allocation of the firms in more details. All of our analysis here is for firm a and similar
results can be shown for firm b as well. For simplicity, we only discuss optimal seeding budget;
optimal quality improvement budget can be found easily using the budget constraint.
A. Effect of Quality of Products on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study how the quality of each product, i.e. qa and qb, can influence the
optimal allocation of seeding and quality improvement budgets.
As it can be seen from equation (16), the threshold vac depends on both firm’s and its rival’s
qualities, i.e. both qa and qb. In the next proposition, we compare the seeding budget of two
firms in the optimal allocation with respect to their qualities.
Proposition 6: Given an equal budget, the firm with higher quality also has higher seeding
budget, i.e. if qa ≤ qb, then ‖~S∗a‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗b ‖1.
Proof: From equations (16) and (17) it can be easily seen that if qa ≤ qb, then vbc ≤ vac .
As a result, more agents satisfy the condition (17) for firm b compared to firm a and therefore,
‖~S∗a‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗b ‖1.
This result is due to diminishing return of quality which means if a firm already has a high
quality it would profit less by spending on quality improvement and it would be better for the
firm to invest on seeding. Also, note that the result of Proposition 6 is similar to the result
of Proposition 1. The only difference is that instead of budgets Ka and Kb in Proposition 1,
qualities qa and qb in Proposition 6 play the role of the budgets while comparing the seedings
of the firms.
In the next proposition we explain how the optimal seeding budget vary with qa and qb.
Proposition 7: Given a fixed graph, the optimal seeding budget is an increasing function of
qa. Furthermore, it is a decreasing function of qb if qb ≤ qa and an increasing function of qb if
qa ≤ qb.
Proof: The optimal seeding budget is a decreasing function of the threshold value vac . Also,
it is easy to see that the threshold value of vac is a decreasing function of qa. This implies the
first part of proposition. For the second part, it is easy to see that the threshold value of vac is a
decreasing function of qa. This implies the first part of proposition. For the second part, it is easy
to see that the threshold value of vac is an increasing function of the quality of product b, when
qb ≤ qa and a decreasing function of the quality of product b, when qb ≥ qa. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 7 implies that a higher quality in a firm’s product results in a higher seeding
budget in the optimal allocation. This can be due to the diminishing return of quality: when
quality is higher there is less need for quality improvement and it would be more profitable to
spend on seeding. Furthermore, when qb ≤ qa, the higher the quality of the rival firm’s product,
the lower the seeding budget of firm a, i.e., if qa ≥ q′b ≥ qb then, ‖~S∗a(q′b)‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗a(qb)‖1. On
the other hand, when competing with a firm whose product has a higher quality, i.e. qb ≥ qa,
the higher the quality of the rival firm’s product, the higher firm a should spend on seeding. In
other words, if qa ≤ qb ≤ q′b then, ‖~S∗a(qb)‖1 ≤ ‖~S∗a(q′b)‖1.
Combining these two results, we can see that given a fixed value of qa, the seeding budget of
firm a is increasing with the difference |qa− qb|. The seeding budget attains its minimum when
qb = qa, implying that the firm should allocate more budget to quality improvement to distance
itself from the rival firm. However, as the gap between qualities widens, competition in qualities
becomes less effective and firms spend more budget on seeding. Also, note that the result of
Proposition 7 is similar to the result of Proposition 2. The only difference is that seeding budgets
vary with qa and qb in Proposition 7, whereas they vary with Ka and Kb in Proposition 2.
B. Effect of Network Structure on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study the effect of network structure on the optimal allocation of the
budget for seeding and quality improvement. First we define seeding capacity of a graph.
Definition 4: The seeding capacity of a graph is the amount that it can be seeded in the
optimal allocation when there is no budget constraint.
We first focus on two well studied graphs, i.e. star and balanced graphs, and highlight how
they can reflect important properties of the seeding budget. The next proposition provides a
condition for seeding profitability of any general graph. Also, the seeding capacity of star and
balanced graphs are compared and it is shown that the graph with higher seeding capacity can
be any of the two, depending on the threshold value of vac in (16).
Proposition 8: If seeding capacity is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will be nonzero for
any other graph too. On the other hand, if seeding capacity is zero for a star graph, it will also
be zero for any other graph. Moreover, if vsl < v
a
c < v¯, a balanced graph has a larger seeding
capacity than a star graph, and if v¯ < vac < v
s
h, a star graph has a larger seeding capacity than
a balanced graph. For 1 < vac < v
s
l they have the same seeding capacity.
Proof: If seeding capacity is nonzero for a balanced graph, then we have vac < v¯. As a
result, for any other graph we will have vac < vmax, where vmax = max vi, since according to
Lemma 3 v¯ ≤ vmax. This means that there exists at least one agent that must be seeded. On the
other hand, if seeding capacity is zero for a star graph, then we must have vac > v
s
h. Since we
know vsh ≥ vi for any agent i of any arbitrary graph, therefore, vac > vi and no agent can be
seeded in any other graph. For the second part of the proposition, if vsl < v
a
c < v¯, then seeding
capacity for the star graph will be Smaxai , where S
max
a1
≥ Smaxa2 ≥ · · · ≥ Smaxan are elements of the
demand capacity vector ~Smaxa and agent i is the central agent. However, for the balanced graph
all agents can be seeded up to their maximum demand capacities and the seeding capacity will
be ‖~Smaxa ‖1. On the other hand, if v¯ < vac < vsh, still seeding for the star graph will be Smaxai ,
however, no agent can be seeded in the balanced graph. For 1 < vac < v
s
l , agents in both graphs
can be seeded up to ‖~Smaxa ‖1.
It is easy to see that Proposition 8 presents very similar results as Proposition 3. The next
proposition provides us with a lower and an upper bound for minimum and maximum seeding
capacities.
Proposition 9: If 1 < vac < v
s
h, the maximum seeding capacity is given by
‖~S∗a‖max1 =
k∑
i=1
Smaxai ,
where
k = min{b nδ
(vac − 1)(2β − δ)
c, n}. (21)
On the other hand, the minimum seeding capacity is Smaxan + S
max
an−1 if 1 < v
a
c < v
s
l , is S
max
an if
vsl < v
a
c < v¯, and is zero if v¯ < v
a
c < v
s
h.
Proof: From condition (16) the more agents with centralities above the threshold vac , the
more seeding budget can be allocated. Therefore, the maximum number of k agents with
centralities above the threshold vac must be found. Since vi ≥ 1 for all agents, first a centrality
of one is given to each agent and then the remainder of the centrality sum is distributed among
maximum number of agents so that each agent receives at least vac − 1, making its overall
centrality greater than vac . It is easy to see that the number of such agents is upper bounded by
b
2βn
2β−δ−n
vac−1 c. This along with the fact that 1 ≤ k ≤ n results in (21). Note that, in order to complete
the proof, we should also provide an example achieving this maximum capacity. For k = 1, the
maximum seeding capacity is clearly achieved by the star graph with the seeding capacity of
Smaxa1 . For k ≥ 2, a graph with largest seeding capacity is the one with k central agents having
the largest demand capacities and with equal centralities of
v˜sh =
nδ
k(2β − δ) + 1,
where k is given in (21), and the remainder n−k agents with the minimum centrality of v˜sl = 1.
For the graph with minimum seeding capacity, similar to the proof of Proposition 8, we have
minimum seeding capacity of Smaxan in star graph if v
s
l < v
a
c < v¯, and zero in balanced graph
if v¯ < vac < v
s
h. For the case where 1 < v
a
c < v
s
l , let i be the agent with the highest centrality.
Clearly, vsl < vi ≤ vsh. Now, considering the fact that sum of the centralities is fixed, there is an
agent j ∈ V − {i} for which vsl ≤ vj . This implies that there exist at least two agents whose
centralities are above vac . An example of a graph with exactly two centralities above v
a
c is a
directed star graph where all edges are directed towards the center except one edge which goes
both ways.
It can be seen from both Proposition 9 and Proposition 4 that graphs with similar structures
attain maximum and minimum seeding in both scenarios.
Example 2: As a numerical example for the minimum and maximum seeding capacities, we
consider a network with n = 15 agents with demand capacity vectors of ~Smaxa = ~S
max
b = (0.5)~1,
qualities of qa = qb = 1, quality and seeding costs of cs = cq = 1 and parameters of α = β = 1
and δ = 0.5. For this example from equations (16) and (17) we have vac = v
b
c = 2.5 and as a result,
from equation (21) we get k = 3. Therefore, a graph with the maximum seeding capacity is a
3-star with seeding capacity of 1.5 as illustrated in Fig. 1. Also, since v¯ = 4
3
< vac , v
b
c < v
s
h = 4.8,
a balanced graph has the minimum seeding capacity of zero. A star graph has a seeding capacity
of 0.5 which is neither a minimum nor a maximum.
Note that in both Example 1 and Example 2 a graph with the maximum seeding budget
and capacity is a 3-star graph and a graph with the minimum seeding budget and capacity is
a balanced graph. A star graph has neither a minimum nor a maximum seeding budget and
capacity in both examples.
As we saw, the structure of the graphs with minimum and maximum seeding capacity depends
on the threshold value of vac . However, for certain values of v
a
c the seeding capacity will be
independent of the structure of the graph, as described in the next proposition.
Proposition 10: If vac > v
s
h no graph can be seeded. On the other hand, if v
a
c < 1 all graphs
can be seeded equally up to agents’ maximum demand capacities.
Proof: The maximum possible centrality happens for the central agent of the star graph as
shown in Lemma 3. As a result, if vac > v
s
h, then we have v
a
c > vi for all i in any graph and from
condition (16) no agent can be seeded. Also, since from definition 1 ≤ vi for all i, if vac < 1
then we have vac < vi for all agents in any graph, and any graph can be seeded up to agents’
maximum demand capacities, given the availability of budget.
It is easy to see that Proposition 10 presents very similar results as Proposition 5.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed and studied a strategic model of marketing and product consumption in social
networks. Two firms compete for maximizing the consumption of their products in a social
network. Initially firms utilize a limited budget to either design the quality of their products or
initially seed a set of agents in the social network. Agents are myopic yet utility maximizing,
given the qualities of the products and actions of their neighbors. This myopic best response
results in a local, linear update dynamics for the consumptions of the agents. We characterized
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game between firms. We showed that at the Nash equilibrium,
firms invest more budget on quality when their budgets are close. However, as the difference
between budgets increases, firms spend more budget on seeding. We also showed that given equal
budget of firms, if seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph it will also be nonzero for
any other graph, and if seeding budget is zero for a star graph it will be zero for any other graph
too. Afterwards, we considered a different scenario in which firms produce two products with
some preset qualities that can only be improved marginally. At some point in time, firms spend
a limited budget to marginally improve the quality of their products and to give free offers to a
set of agents in the network in order to promote their products. We derived a simple threshold
rule for the optimal allocation of the budget between new seedings and quality improvement. We
showed that the optimal allocation of the budget in particular depends on the entire centrality
distribution of the graph and the qualities of the products. Furthermore, we derived similar results
to the original setup for this scenario, in which preset qualities resemble the role of budgets.
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